Introduction
How did Byron, the Shelleys and their circle react to the political reconstruction of Europe following Napoleon's final defeat in 1815? How did they understand the 'state' or 'condition' of Europe after twenty-six years of ideological and military conflict? This article investigates how the Shelleys, Byron and John Cam Hobhouse analyse the European political situation in the eighteen months immediately following Waterloo. In particular, it discusses how they interpret European politics through use of the words 'freedom' and 'liberty'. Sometimes this language of freedom constructs a transnational European community, in which states are connected by their shared commitment to 'free' government. Complicating this, however, the circle also associate 'freedom' with ideas of state independence; that is, a Europe divided into rival states independent from one another and not necessarily unified by any common tradition. In this respect, the idea of 'freedom' both evokes and challenges notions of a common European identity. These different usages might appear to be straightforwardly contradictory, but they can be connected, I want to suggest, using the argument of William Hazlitt's essay 'On Patriotism' (1814), which argues for a patriotic politics that can legitimise transnational collective identity.
The European Tradition of Freedom
In 1815 and 1816, the Shelley-Byron circle produced a number of texts which, directly and indirectly, reflect on the current 'state' of European politics. This includes the third Canto of Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, which Byron wrote between May and September 1816 as he travelled to Switzerland; 1 Hobhouse's published work on Napoleon's downfall, based on his experiences in Paris in mid-1815; and the Shelleys' writings immediately following Waterloo and on their own excursion to Switzerland in 1816, particularly the History of a Six Weeks' Tour. These texts, as I suggest below, attempt to delineate a 'tradition of freedom': a shared trajectory for European countries which identifies both a common history and the prospect of future unity. In doing this, however, they follow established lines of thought about the relationship between 'Europe' and 'freedom'. In order to understand the Shelley-Byron circle's distinctive contributions to this idea, I would first like to note its common currency in eighteenth-century works.
Many eighteenth-century reference books devote considerable space to defining and outlining a European tradition of 'free' government. For example, William Guthrie, a best-selling historian and geographer whose Geographical, Historical and Commercial Grammar (1770) ran to twenty-four editions by 1827, describes Europe as 'unrestrained' in commerce, government and religion, especially when compared to the 'tyrannical' regimes of Asia. 2 This difference between European and Asian governmental traditions is explained in terms of environmental factors: Guthrie's New System of Modern Geography (1792) suggests that the spread of despotism is prevented in Europe by the varied land-surface forming 'natural barriers which check the progress of conquest'. In Asian countries, the large extent of land makes despotism inevitable, since only one individual ruling by force can keep the country in order. In Europe, however, 'the barren rocks and mountains are more favourable for exciting human industry and invention, than the natural unsolicited luxuriancy of more fertile soils'. For this reason, ancient Greece is where the human mind 'began to avail itself of its strength' and where European 'industry and invention' began, because it is the most variable and broken of territories. Greece's development epitomises Europe's: it is an exemplar of 'equity of laws and the freedom of political constitution'.
3 Some eighteenth-century reference books even define the word 'Europe' itself in terms of freedom. According to the anonymous Complete System of Geography (1747), as well as a large number of other sources, Europe 'is called [. . . ] "Alfrank" by the Turks; "Frankoba" by Georgians; and "Frankistan" by Asian peoples'. 4 This is particularly interesting given that the word 'frank' has etymological associations with 'free' and 'freedom': according to the OED, 'frank' can mean 'free in condition; not in serfdom or slavery'; 'released from captivity'; 'free from restraint or impediment'. 5 Of course, it is not entirely clear whether non-Europeans genuinely saw Europe as the 'land of the free', or whether this was how Europeans imagined that others saw them. 6 Nevertheless, the idea of Furthermore, the phrase 'fellow feeling' evokes Margaret Cohen and April Alliston's notion of the 'sentimental community'. For them, popular eighteenth-and nineteenth-century texts by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Germaine de Staël and others induce an 'emotional connection that transcends nations' by appealing to a wide community of readers not limited by national borders. 10 Mary Shelley gives this concept a political dimension: she suggests that 'fellow feeling' for liberty allows one to comprehend Europe in terms of transnational political principles, rather than as separate national identities. In this way, Europe's past and future are defined by 'sympathy' for libertarian causes.
Byron, however, seems less optimistic about the prospects for 'free' government. In Childe Harold III, he identifies a tradition of freedom under threat:
While Waterloo with Cannae's carnage vies Morat and Marathon twin names shall stand, They were true Glory's stainless victories, Won by the unambitious heart and hand Of a proud, brotherly and civic band, All unbright champions in no princely cause Of vice-entail'd Corruption; they no land Doom'd to bewail the blasphemy of laws Making kings rights divine, by some Draconian clause. He was Freedom's champion, one of those, The few in number, who had not o'erstept The charter to chastise which she bestows (549-51).
For Byron, as for Mary Shelley, Europe's achievements are defined by the liberty and common purpose associated with opposition to monarchical power. But Childe Harold also articulates another tradition which seeks to limit that freedom: the 'Draconian clause' which resists the efforts of the 'civic band'. Europe's history and future is thus based on conflict between advocates and opponents of freedom. Caroline Franklin argues that Childe Harold is 'a profound elegy for the permanent loss of political freedom in the cycles or "revolutions" of European history'. Byron's pessimism, she says, 'deconstructed the Whigs' and the radicals' view of history as progress'.
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In fact, however, Byron understands European freedom as a concept in flux, not just inexorable decline. Although Waterloo appears to be a victory for the 'Draconian clause', hope still exists:
We do not curse thee Waterloo! Though Freedom's blood thy plain bedew; There 'twas shed, but is not sunkRising from each gory trunk, Like the water-spout from ocean, With a strong and growing motionIt soars and mingles in the air. ('Ode (from the French)', 1-7) 12 The poem seems to suggest that cause of freedom has been set back by Napoleon's defeat. And yet Napoleon himself is described both as 'Freedom's son' (27) , and as a proud, monarch, a hero who 'sank into a King' (33) -meaning that his downfall simultaneously marks the defeat of both 'free' government and kingly arrogance. This ambiguous presentation of Napoleon expresses uncertainty over Europe's direction: does Napoleon's deposition indicate a continuation of or a disruption in the tradition of freedom? As the poem continues, the speaker strives to answer this question, eventually claiming that 'Freedom rejoices' (73) In The Siege of Corinth (also published in early 1816), Byron is similarly concerned for the loss, and possible recovery, of freedom. The speaker laments how 'Venice ceased to be / Her ancient civic boast -"the Free"' (84-5), before tracing the history (and future prospects) of that 'freedom' back to Christianity and ancient Greece, now overrun with oriental despotism: "Till Christian hands to Greece restore / The freedom Venice gave of yore' (104-5). Like the Supplement to [. . . ] Britannica, the poem uses 'freedom' to connect different periods and locations as part of a discernable tradition, but unlike the reference book, it also discusses manifest threats to that freedom, mainly from 'the Moslem's sway' (107). The use of Venice is particularly important here. Malcolm Kelsall suggests that, for Byron, Venice was not only 'the meeting place of Occident and Orient in a direct imperial and religious conflict', but also signifies the 'transition of a former imperial power to colonial status', particularly after Napoleon conquered and abolished the Venetian Republic in 1797. 13 In this respect, Venice represents the intricate constructions and tensions of European history: empire and colony, Christianity and Islam, freedom and tyranny. Byron's awareness of these complex interactions makes him cynical about unthinkingly optimistic ideas of progress, but this scepticism does not, I would suggest, define his conception of post-Napoleonic Europe and its potential for 'free' government.
John Cam Hobhouse, Byron's friend and travelling companion, also muses on the complexities of the libertarian tradition: 'it cannot be concealed, there is in the flight of Napoleon a precipitancy which nothing can escape; and we must sigh as Montesquieu did over the suicide of Brutus, to see the cause of liberty so easily abandoned'. 14 Hobhouse identifies Napoleon with a tradition of freedom that extends deep into history, beyond the philosophes and back to the classical world. Like Byron, though, he is preoccupied by the prospective failure of that tradition. Indeed, Napoleon seems to embody both the possibility of greater liberty and the disappointments of its dissipation. If here he is the banished emblem of freedom, later his presence, rather than his absence, hinders liberty's progress: 'France would have now been free had not Napoleon come back' (Recollections, ii. Europe, but at present exists only in England -where 'the rights of the citizen' are respected and 'the desire of freedom has made the capital [. . . ] affluent in money and men, so their wealth gave them the ability to defend and confirm their independence'. 15 Despite this stress on British 'independence', Hobhouse envisages this as a European-wide ideal, proposing that all states should strive for this condition. As an Empire, France had drawn closer to this model system, for despite 'the tyranny of Napoleon', 'the circumstances of his elevation [. . . ] confirm the notions of the power of individual exertion, and the original equality of man' (Last Reign, i. 218). By contrast, Castlereagh's political objective -to restore the 'ancient social system' of monarchies -completely betrays the notion of European liberty by supporting despotic regimes and refusing to acknowledge that other states should be free to govern themselves (i. 222). There is an inconsistency here: Hobhouse opposes Britain being 'the arbitress of Europe' (i. 225), but still upholds the British governmental system as the ideal model for the realisation of European freedom. This leads him into slightly self-contradictory territory, arguing that both Britain and Napoleon's France alternately represent and prevent the development of liberty.
However, the term 'freedom' is not merely used by radical thinkers like Mary Shelley, Byron and Hobhouse. The conservative scholar T. H. Horne, writing in 1816, rejoices that Napoleon's downfall has 'gladdened the heart of every lover of freedom', since his usurpation was an offence to Europe's ancient traditions. He calls the Napoleonic Wars 'The Campaign of the Liberties of Europe', suggesting that a 'free' Europe is one which replicates the pre-1789 status quo. 16 Castlereagh himself even employs this terminology to justify British government policy: 'the powers of Europe', he says, treating the sub-continent as a totality, 'have been compelled, in vindication of their own liberties, and for the settlement of the world, to invade France'. 17 This language recalls William Robertson's use of 'liberty' in the 1760s. In his View of the Progress of Society in Europe, Robertson refers to the balance of power in terms of liberty: 'the method of preventing any monarch from rising to such a degree of power, as was inconsistent with the general liberty'. 18 This associates the word with 'stability', a usage which contrasts with liberal and radical writers who employ 'freedom' and 'liberty' to refer to changes in governmental organisation. For the anti-establishment political writer George Ensor, whose On the State of Europe appeared in 1816, 'free nations' are to be contrasted with 'the abyss of monarchy'. Alluding to the precedent of ancient Athens, he asserts that monarchy, not Revolutionary France, is an aberration from the proper order of things. 19 These writers base their understandings of European history and futurity upon different notions of freedom, using various interpretations of the libertarian tradition to analyse contemporary politics and to construct teleologies of what Europe should be like, based on a conception of its 'free' past.
Percy Shelley, however, directly challenges the concept of a free tradition particular to European states. In a fragment known to editors as 'The Elysian Fields' and written either in 1815 or 1816, the speaker says that: the English nation does not, as has been imagined, inherit freedom from its ancestors. Public opinion rather than private institution maintains it in whatever portion it may now possess [. . . ] As yet the gradation [by] which this freedom has advanced has been contested step by step. 20 These sentences make 'freedom' iconoclastic, opposed to institutions and continually re-imagined by each generation, not passed on in an identifiable tradition or progression. Moreover, because Shelley emphasises both the Englishness and the locality of the 'public opinion' which defines this freedom, his suggestions stand against the more general 'European liberty' identified by Byron and Hobhouse, which extends from ancient Greece to the Revolution as part of abstract tradition. This idea treats freedom as a progress theory, sometimes hindered, but gradually developing in a single direction. Instead, Shelley emphasises the multiplicity of possible futures: how a momentary popular reassessment of freedom, disconnected from previous interpretations, can abruptly change society, or literally free it from its past.
Liberty and the State of Independence 'Liberty', then, often evokes a common European ideal -a notion of how Europe can be shaped through the alleged liberation of the Revolution or (for conservative writers) the freedoms of the 'ancient social system'. However, liberty is also associated with ideas of state independence: that is, a Europe divided into rival national blocs with no shared tradition. Byron's friend James Wedderburne Webster employs 'freedom' in a strictly patriotic context in his poem 'Waterloo' (1816), asserting the supremacy of England over its enemies: Wellington's victory 'Hath swell'd his Country's Harp of fame' and subdued French tyranny by protecting 'the free'. 21 The struggle for freedom and the struggle for state self-assertion are thus connected. Mary Shelley makes a similar point when she observes that the Swiss could 'make a brave defence against any invader of their freedom'. In other words, they can best defend their liberty by preserving independence and self-government (Six Weeks' Tour, 50).
Hobhouse also connects liberty with independence by calling the Napoleonic conflicts 'the late war against national independence' -a struggle for France's self-assertion against an Alliance determined to crush its new freedoms. The success of this aggression may 'serve for a precedent fatal to our own liberties' (Last Reign, i. xi). Hobhouse here associates general European freedom with the capacity for states to operate independently, unmolested by other powers. This argument is clearly problematic, since it can be argued that French foreign policy before and during Napoleon's reign violated the freedoms of other 'independent' states. Nevertheless, Hobhouse advocates an idea of Europe based on 'the principles of national liberty', suggesting that greater international co-operation can be achieved by separately-operating states, because powers would be discouraged from interfering in each other's affairs. He looks forward to the moment when 'the alliance will dissolve' and 'the first decisive triumph of the principles of national liberty will be witnessed'. If this occurs, 'a new system' of Europe can develop, based on the freedom of separate states (Last Reign, ii. 217). Once again, there is a radical agenda here: Hobhouse hopes that this revolutionary change will 'embrace state after state', eventually encompassing 'the fairest portion of the civilised world' (Last Reign, ii. 217).
This association of liberty with revolution and national self-determination would become an important part of Byron's thinking as his interest in Greek independence developed in the 1820s. Before landing on the Greek mainland, he would justify his purpose using the language of nation-building -'I did not come here to join a faction, but a nation' -and the language of freedom: 'the fruitful [. . . boughs?] of the tree of Liberty' will flourish. 22 According to his acquaintance James Kennedy (a clergyman on Cephalonia), Byron proclaimed, ' "I love the cause of liberty, which is that of the Greek nation"'. 23 Calling on the support of Edward Church, the United States consul in Geneva, Byron says: 'an American has a better right than any other to suggest to other nations -the mode of obtaining that Liberty which is the glory of his own' (letter dated 21 June 1823, BLJ, x. 202). In this sense, the cause of liberty helps create both independent nationhood and a transnational movement joined in opposition to tyrannous government. A similar idea is evident in some assessments of Napoleon's defeat. The preface to the 1816 Annual Register says that in Germany: popular writers had been encouraged to arouse and create patriotic feelings by the contrast between slavish submission to a detestable foreign tyranny, and the acquiescence of freemen in a constitution.
This excites anti-Napoleonic feeling by uniting the language of liberty and nationalism. But it also moves beyond its German specificity to present an idea of Europe in which many countries are connected by their shared freedom, formed in opposition to Napoleonic hegemony. Britain's victory was partly assured by 'the liberalities of our political institutions' and other states, including Russia, have emulated this with 'openness and success'. In this last case, 'liberty' refers both to a national trait and to an idea which can potentially shape all Europe. 24 
Patriotism Beyond the Local
Debate about what Europe is (or what it should be) thus hinges on a few key concepts -'liberty', 'freedom', 'independence' -which can be appropriated for a variety of ideological purposes. 'Liberty' can be used to evoke a shared European tradition and a Europe of separate states asserting themselves against one another. These various usages of the term 'liberty' might seem contradictory. However, they can be connected using the argument of William Hazlitt's essay 'On Patriotism' (1814). In the essay, Hazlitt theorises a nationalism which legitimises a wider, transnational, collective identity.
Love of country, he says, 'is little more than another name for the love of liberty, of independence, of peace, and social happiness'. 25 In other words, patriotism inspires, not merely a devotion to a particular state, but also a universalist social vision, an ideal for all societies. As J. G. A. Pocock observes, 'patriot' has a number of disparate meanings in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It could signify devotion to the local nation, but also a person 'who loved his or her country more than its ruling family or institutions' and who professed loyalty to a common identity not represented by the national government. 26 In this sense, Hazlitt can use the word both to allude to and look beyond the nation, evoking shared principles ('liberty', 'peace') which are not solely applicable to a specific state.
Hazlitt's arguments about liberty and patriotism rework some of Richard Price's ideas in Discourse on the Love of Our Country (1789). Hazlitt was well acquainted with Price's thinking: Price corresponded with Hazlitt's father, and Hazlitt's own letters record detailed engagement with his works. 27 It is therefore likely that Hazlitt had read the Discourse, especially given its heightened public prominence (even notoriety) following Burke's attack on the text in Reflections on the Revolution (1790). 28 The blaze of Revolution 'lays despotism in ashes, and warms and illuminates Europe!' (p. 50). 'Freedom' establishes a patriotic identity, marking the uniqueness of France, but it also creates collective hopes for 'Europe' based on the shared principles of law, reason and opposition to despotism. For Price, as for Hazlitt, patriotism inspires not merely a devotion to a particular state, but also a universalist social vision, an ideal for all societies. Hazlitt's patriotism, associated with (revolutionary) social change, therefore has both national and transnational implications. This is patriotism beyond the 'local', which hopes for universal 'common liberties' extending across all Europe and beyond.
These arguments provide a useful framework to understand Percy Shelley's comments about 'freedom' in 1816. Writing to Thomas Peacock, he connects freedom with national specificity whilst purporting to question precisely that connection:
You live in a free country where you may act without restraint & possess that which you possess in security; for as long as the name of country & the selfish conceptions which it included shall subsist England I am persuaded, is the most free and refined. (Percy Shelley, Letters, i. 474-5) Shelley identifies and seeks to move beyond a particularly English freedom: while declaring his patriotic attachment to 'England, my country dear to me for ever', he also critiques the limited experiences available to one 'who has never passed the limits of his native land' (Letters, i. 475). Percy Shelley advocates what might be called a 'cosmopolitan patriotism', which predicates itself on experience and appreciation of other countries. In celebrating and seeking to overcome the separations between European states, Price similarly exhorted listeners to: 'explain the duty we owe to our country, and the nature, foundation, and proper expressions of that love to it', but also warns against 'contempt of other countries, and forming men into combinations and factions against their common rights and liberties' (Discourse, 1-2, 5). When they rail against despotism in France, Turkey or Russia, Price and Shelley patriotically assert Britain's superiority, but also regret that 'common. . . liberties', a cosmopolitan notion of shared 'rights', have not extended there.
For Price, Hazlitt and Shelley therefore, 'liberty' has a parochial meaning related to state independence and a transnational meaning signifying the collective development of all Europe. More importantly, these meanings are not necessarily incompatible. For all three writers, it is perfectly possible to be patriotic, to defend local independence, and to hope for a 'liberty' which unifies states across Europe under a common system. This is because the key tenets of radical 'liberty' -opposition to despotism, to monarchical or religious privilege -are both national and transnational causes. That is to say, the independence of a specific country and the establishment of common 'freedom' in Europe are part of the same radical project. The true patriot desires reform at home and abroad; he wishes to celebrate success in his own country and to instigate changes based on common principles across all Europe. It is therefore possible to be both a patriot and a cosmopolitan simultaneously, because 'love of one's country' and the desire for international co-operation are based on commitment to the same radical principles. For the Shelley-Byron circle, ideas of state independence and common European liberty are not as disconnected as might first appear, since both are founded in a radical vision of the ideal society.
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